Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and Financing by Simon Kuznets & Elizabeth Jenks
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and Financing





Chapter Title: Long Swings in Population Growth, Capital Formation,
and National Product
Chapter Author: Simon Kuznets, Elizabeth Jenks
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1450
Chapter pages in book: (p. 316 - 360)CHAPTER 7
Long Swings in Population Growth,
Capital Formation, and National Product
IN Chapter 2 we discussed the existence of long swings in the rate of
growth, a component of change that has to be recognized when we
distinguish long-term trends from the shorter fluctuations. If long-
term trends mean movements that persist in one direction over periods
as long as twenty-five to thirty years, and if we describe those long-term
trends and remove them, the residuals reveal that in addition to the
shorter fluctuations associated with business cycles there are longer
up-and-down movements. Their amplitude is not insignificant and an
analysis of long-term changes—longer than business cycles—must take
them into account. Charts 2 and 3 illustrated such long swings in gross
national product, in constant prices. It was to eliminate those long
swings that the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 was based largely on
thirty-year averages, and that in the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6
we studied the longer periods, or shorter periods selected to represent
possibly similar levels in the long swing.
We now consider directly these up-and-down movements in the
volume or rate of growth of the economic variables of importance in
connection with past and prospective trends in capital formation and
financing. In the discussion that follows, we cannot hope to give a
complete picture of the prevalence of long swings in the movement
over time of the various aspects of the country's economy. For this
purpose the data should cover a much longer period and should relate,
on a continuous, almost annual, basis to many more aspects of the
economy than they do. The analysis requires laborious statistical
manipulation, the application of which to a large number of series
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becomes a forbidding chore. An even greater difficulty lies in the fact
that the analytical literature on this topic is only in its very beginnings,
and we have no large stock of accumulated findings to draw upon.'
Under the circumstances, we can only suggest the broad outlines of
the long swings as they can be observed in the countrywide aggregates
with which we deal, to provide at least an indication of the magnitude
of this particular pattern of change over time, the mechanism of
relations among various components in the economy during these
swings, and the importance to be assigned to them in any consideration
of the bearing of past trends upon the future.
The present chapter is devoted to an attempt to describe the long
swings in the real flows, that is, in capital formation, national product,
and the related components and variables. Chapter 8 will deal with
the long swings in financial flows.
Population Movements
Population offers the best way of breaking into the chain of intercon
nections among the several economic variables that is involved in any
pattern of movement over time—long swings included. Population
estimates also happen to be one of our best series, independent of the
sources from which capital formation and national product estimates
are derived, and they are less subject to imaginative piecing out and to
limiting theoretical assumptions than the more synthetic economic
totals.
Additions to population are clearly an important factor in the
demand for new housing and for additional consumer goods, and in
eventually providing additions to the labor force. We begin therefore
1Anearly survey of the problem of long swings is given in Wesley C. Mitchell,
Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting (New York, NBER, 1927), pp. 226—230.
Later discussions include Simon Kuznets, Secular Movements in Production and
Prices (Houghton Mifilin, 1930), pp. 200—267; Arthur F. Burns, Production Trends
in the United States Since 1870 (New York, NBER, 1934), pp. 174—252; and more
recently, Brinley Thomas, Migration and Economic Growth (Cambridge, England,
1954), and W. Arthur Lewis, "Secular Swings in Production and Trade" (Man.
chester School of Economic and Social Studies, May 1955).
Since this chapter was written, Moses Abramovitz has initiated a comprehensive
analysis of long swings in the growth of the American economy, with particular
emphasis on capital formation, Some preliminary results of the analysis appear in
the following annual reports of the National Bureau: 38th, May 1958, pp. 47—56;
39th, May 1959, pp. 23—27; and 40th, May 1960, pp. 19—21. It has not been possible
here to take advantage of Abramovitz' suggestive findings, which may lead to
analytical hypotheses somewhat different from those suggested in the text.
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by observing the rate of additions to the population of the United
States (Chart 4).
The measures of population growth used here are the changes be-
tween quinquennial averages ten years apart. The only exception is
the use at each end of the series, when quinquennial averages are not
CHART4
Decadal Additions to Native Born, Foreign Born White, and Total Population,
1870—1955
available, of changes over ten-year spans between single years (one
entry at each end) and between three-year averages (one penultimate
entry at each end). The use of quinquennial averages tends to smooth
out the rather mild short-term changes in the annual population
figures. Since we use the increment over ten-year periods, the ab-
solute growth is large relative to any short-term fluctuations that may
still remain in the five-year moving averages—provided, of course, that
long-term growth has been substantial, as it has been in this country's
population. Hence these measures of absolute additions to population,
over decennial intervals taken successively with an overlap of one year,
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are largely free from effects of short-term changes of the kind associated
with business cycles.2
The long swings in additions to population are clearly shown in
Chart 4. Thus for total population, the additions rise to a peak in the
mid- or late 1880's (each addition is centered in the middle of the
decade for which it is calculated), decline to a trough in the mid-l890's,
rise to another peak in 1909, decline again to a trough in 1917, rise
moderately to another peak in the mid-l920's, show a sharp dip in the
mid-l930's and then a sharp rise with its crest not yet in sight. Similar
long swings can be observed not only in additions to the foreign born
white population—in which they are quite prominent before the legal
limitations on immigration that began in the 1920's and continued
with progressing severity—but also in additions to the native born
population, in which they tend to be less pronounced.
Nothing in the procedure used to calculate the additions to popu-
lation would, in and of itself, produce the long swings. In fact, we
know that immigration, for which annual data are available, did
fluctuate in highly pronounced twenty-year swings, and it is their effect
that is reflected in the additions to the foreign born white population.
These up-and-down movements in the volume of immigration and the
stock of foreign born would themselves produce swings in additions
to native born children of foreign born. Moreover, available data on
the native born children of native parentage give evidence of long
swings in the additions to their numbers.' So far as the procedure is
concerned, the additions to population in Chart 4 could look like
roughly straight lines, or lines with continuous acceleration or decelera-
tion. Whatever swings are shown must be in the original data.5
2 Of the reference cycles in the United States from 1869 through 1955, counting
from trough to trough or peak to peak, only 7werelonger than five years. The al-
ternative procedure, using average values for successive reference cycles, would not
change the results significantly, as was illustrated in Chart 2. Nor would the results
be very different if seven.year or nine-year moving averages—also a decade apart—
were used.
See Simon Kuznets and Ernest Rubin, Immigration and the Foreign Born, Oc-
casional Paper 46 (New York, NBER, 1954), particularly Table 4 and Chart 3,
pp. 28—29.
4 See Kuznets, "Long Swings in the Growth of Population and in Related Economic
Variables," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, February 1958, pp.
25—52. Much of the following discussion relating to population can be found in
greater detail in that paper.
s In fact, the danger is not that the procedure introduces swings where they
did not exist, but that it fails to reveal swings of a specified character. Assume that
there was a highly symmetrical and regular ten-year swing in population additions
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Granting the existence of these long up-and-down movements in
additions to population, we record some of their quantitative char-
acteristics (Table 59). In part A we attempt to date the troughs and
peaks of the long swings by inspection of Chart 4. Precise dating is
not always easy or necessarily meaningful, because each entry repre-
sents a decadal average. Furthermore, there is the problem of estab-
lishing the turning points at the ends of the series. In general, to
avoid losing too much of the available record, we assumed that the
first and the last year represented turning points—even though the
phases may have begun earlier or ended later. In any case, we cannot
provide accurate and specific measures but only suggest rough orders
of magnitude.
The swings average about twenty years in duration, and their am-
plitude can be seen clearly from changes in the values entered in part B
of the table. Thus, in column 1, additions to the foreign born white
population are 1.1 million for the decade centered in the first trough
(from 1870 to 1880, inclusive), but are more than double that, 2.5
million, for the decade centered in the following peak (from 1879 to
1889, inclusive). The alternations in additions from trough to peak
and from peak to trough, on a per year basis, are entered in part C.
Finally, the most complete measure of amplitude, the difference in
the rate of change in additions between successive phases, is entered
in part D.
The additions are measured on an absolute, not a percentage, basis.
If a population is growing at a constant (or systematically accelerating
or decelerating) percentage rate, we would expect the absolute addi-
tions per year to increase (or decrease) steadily. However, the actual
additions per decade for total population rise and decline in swings
of roughly twenty years' duration (column 3). The alternations in addi-
tions are quite substantial. In the first observed swing, the rate of addi-
tions increased from 10.0 to 12.9 million per decade, then declined to
12.5 iniflion, and after the first swing the up-and-down movements were
even more pronounced.
reflected in the annual data. A five-year moving average would not eliminate such
a swing completely; but additions over successive ten-year intervals would not re-
flect it, because the differences would be taken between points representing identical
phases within the ten-year cycle. And what is true of a regular ten-year cycle would
be roughly true of a cycle of approximately the same duration. This means that the
procedure cannot reveal long swings with a duration of about a decade or less—a
limitation that is not serious, because a distinction between swings of that duration
and business cycles could not be drawn easily.
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TIMING AND AMPLITUDE OF LONG SWINGS IN ADDITIONS TO NATIVE BORN,















A. DATES OF TURNING POINTS









C. CHANGES PER YEAR DURING SUCESSWE PHASES
D. CHANGES BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE PHASES
In this and the following tables and accompanying charts, the title dates cover the
earliest and latest years in the moving averages underlying the Computations.
The turning points are dated by inspection of Chart 4 and the underlying series.
Entries in parentheses, here and in the following tables, are alternative estimates,
shown because there is no clear indication of when a given phase ends and another
begins.
SOURCE:The series used are the five-year moving averages of population from
Table R-37 and the underlying annual estimates. For the years beyond 1939 for which
no five-year averages are available we used the estimates for 1940, 1945, 1950, and 1955
given in the paper referred to in text footnote 4. The entries in lines 9 to 16 are changes
between moving averages (or single years) ten years apart, centered in the middle of
the decade.Entries in lines 24 to 29 are derived directly from those in lines 17 to 23.
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1.First trough 1875 1876 1875
2.Peak 1884 1888 1888 (1885)
3.Trough 1896 1897 1895 (1897)
4.Peak 1907 1911 1909
5.Trough 1920 1915 1917
6.Peak 1923 1924 1924
7.Trough 1935 1935 1935
8.Peak 1950 1950 1950
1.1 8.9 10.0
2.5 10.9 12.9 (12.8)






17.Trough to peak(line9 to line 10) +0.16 +0.17 +0.22 (0.28)
18.Peak to trough(line 10 to line Ii) —0.14 +0.09 —0.06 (—0.02)
19.Trough to peak (line 11 to line 12) +0.24 +0.19 +0.34
20.Peak to trough (line 12 to line 13) —0.29 0.00 —0.34
21.Trough to peak (line 13 to line 14) +0.13 +0.18 +0.20
22.Peak to trough (line 14 to line 15) —0.22 —0.34 —0.58
23.Trough to peak (line 15 to line 16) +0.15 +0.79 +0.93
24.Trough to trough(line 17 to line 18) —0.30 —0.08 —0.28
25.Peak to peak (line 18 to line 19) +0.38 +0.10 +0.40
26.Trough to trough(line 19 to line 20) —0.53 —0.19 —0.68
27.Peak to peak (line 20 to line 21) +0.42 +0.18 +0.54
28.Trough to trough(line 21 to line 22) —0.35 —0.52 —0.78
29.Peak to peak (line 22 to line 23) +0.37 +1.13 + 1.51Long Swings
Two further findings of interest are suggested by the entries in
Table 59. First, the amplitude of the swings has increased, and more
substantially than the base. Thus for total population the differential
movement (part D) was at the rate of some 0.3 or 0.4 million per year
(3 or 4 million per decade), when additions were between 10 and 13
million per decade—a ratio of about a third. In the last two swings, the
differential amplitude was at a rate of either 8 or 15 million per decade
and the average additions were between 10 and 24 million—ratios of
from 0.6 to 0.8 and far higher than those for the earliest swings.
Second, the relative contributions of the foreign born white and the
native born components to the long swings in additions to total popu-
lation have shifted continuously. The differential amplitude in addi-
tions to native population relative to that in additions to foreign born
white population rose steadily—from about one-fourth to over three
times the latter (lines 24 and 29). To put it differently, before the 1920's
the long swings in additions to the foreign born white population ac-
counted for most of the long swings in additions to total population,
and after the 1920's the relationship was reversed—long swings in
additions to native born population dominating the swings in total
population growth.
Above all, it must be stressed that these long up-and-down move-
ments in additions to this country's population have not been due ex-
clusively to the long swings in immigration. The rate of natural in-
crease of the native born, i.e., if we disregard the direct effects of immi-
gration, appears to be subject to long swings reflected largely in the
birth rates. In other words, conditions that produced the movements in
immigration produced similar movements (although of narrower am-
plitude) in the number of native born children of native born parents.
These swings in native births to native born parents have certainly
been the dominating component in recent swings in additions to total
population, and they were not insignificant even before World War I.
Another aspect of population movements to consider here is internal
migration within the country—shifts in residence, particularly long
term rather than brief and temporary. Population may be constant in
numbers but, if there are extensive shifts in residence, the demand for
housing will grow in areas that gain from internal migration, even
though there may be unoccupied houses in areas that lose. Internal
migration may thus have an effect on demand for residential construc-
tion and related facilities not unlike that of additions to total popu-
lation, especially if the movement is from areas of low capital invest-
322Population Growth and Countrywide Aggregates
ment per head (as the countryside) to high (as urban communities).
Likewise, if internal migration is a response to differential economic
opportunities it may be tantamount to an increase in the supply of
labor, since labor is flowing to higher-income and, presumably, more
productive uses. In this sense, too, internal migration may be like
net additions to population, in that it contributes to an increase in
the effective labor supply.
The available data permit estimates of internal migration in the
United States only for the native born, for the approximate decade
intervals between the successive population censuses. Furthermore, the
estimates show only the net surviving balance of migrants, not the
total migration into and out of various areas within the country. It is
impossible here to describe the calculations in detail.6 For interstate
migration the general procedure was to allow for the deaths of native
born in a given decade for each state, for whites and nonwhites sepa-
rately, by age and sex, and compare the number of survivors with the
number shown in the state at the next census. The difference is the
number of survivors of the total to-and-fro migration that occurred
over the period, on the valid assumption that few native born left
the country. For the rural-urban migration the general procedure was
to assume, quite crudely, that the natural increase in native born over
the census interval was the same for the rural and urban populations
enumerated at the beginning of each census decade. The application
of that rate of increase to the rural and urban bases separately shows
the deficiency in the rural population matched by the excess in the
urban, and the deficiency was used as an approximation to the rural-
urban net migration.
Both types of estimates understate the volume of internal migration
by substantial fractions. The first, interstate migration, omits all migra-
tion within state boundaries. It is a measure of net shift, whereas a
measure of gross in-migration to an area and one for the offseting out-
migration would have been far more useful. The second, rural-urban
migration, is an understatement because the true rates of natural in-
crease tend to be significantly higher for the rural than for the urban
sector, and because migration within the rural and, more importantly,
6the parts dealing with population redistribution in Population Redistribu-
tion and Economic Growth, United States, 1870—1950, Vol. I, by E. S. Lee, A. R.
Miller, C. P. Brainerd, and R. A. Easterlin, prepared under the direction of Simon
Kuznets and Dorothy S. Thomas (Memoirs Volume 45, American Philosophical
Society, 1957).
323Long Swings
within the urban is not recorded. Understatement of the volume of in-
ternal migration is probably accompanied by an understatement of
the amplitude of any long swings in that volume, not only because long,
decadal intervals are used, but also because some of the more sensitive
components of migration are not properly reflected.
CHART5
Decadal Additions to Total Population Compared with Internal Migration of
Native Born Per Decade, 869—1955
aAdditions to total population
bInterstate migration native born
CRural—urban migration, native born











These qualifications must be kept in mind when we compare in-
ternal migration with additions to total population (Chart 5). Internal
migration (lines b, c, and d) had to be plotted in decadal units (with
pro rata adjustments for the slight inequalities in the census decade in-
tervals); and for additions to total population (line a), we added the
line connecting the mid-points of the decadal intervals.
Itis immediately apparent that even these rough measures of
internal migration are subject to long swings, synchronous, on the
whole, with those in additions to total population. There is one ex-
ception: during the decade including World War I, when additions to
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creased—an expected and easily explained difference in movement.
The impact of a great war, with the shift in production and population
induced by military production and mobilization, intensifies internal
migration, regardless of the movement in additions to total population.
If the decade including World War II had fallen in the downward
phase of a long swing in total population growth (as did the decade
including World War I), we might have observed a second exception.
But as the record stands, the synchronism appears significant.
As already indicated, our internal migration measures relate to native
born population alone, while additions to total population include
foreign born, and in fact the earlier long swings in total population
were dominated by the long swings in immigration. Hence, in summary
of the finding in Chart 5, the conditions that increased or retarded the
pace of immigration and of additions to total population also increased
or retarded the pace of internal migration of the native born popula-
tion (largely adult, because the proportion of infant migrants is ex-
ceedingly low).
The comparison of internal migration with total additions to popu-
lation is given in Table 60. The entries are for intercensal intervals,
adjusted, when necessary, to precise decades.
Obviously, there is some overlap between interstate and rural-urban
migration. Movement from one state to another may involve a shift
from a rural to an urban area and, to that extent, adding the two
totals leads to duplication. On the other hand since, for reasons in-
dicated, each measure understates the true migration by a substantial
fraction, there is little doubt that even the total of the two is an under-
estimate of the amount of net nontransient internal migration of the
native born in each decade.
It is this observation that makes column 4 so impressive. Even these
underestimates of decadal migration range from almost three-tenths
to over six-tenths of the total additions to population. And I would
not be surprised if the true volume of nontransient migration during
any decade was at least equal to the total additions to population.
Several other findings are suggested by Table 60. (1) As part C
shows, the changes between successive decades in total internal migra-
tion (column 4) and in interstate migration (column 2)—but not in
rural-urban migration (column 3), because of the effect of World
War I—are synchronous with changes in additions to total population
(column 1). (2) The amplitude of long swings in internal migration is
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TABLE 60
ADDITIONS TO TOTAL POPULATION COMPARED WITH





to Total Rural- Internal
Population Interstate Urban (2) + (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. VOLUMES PER DECADE
1. 1870—1880 10.0 1.52 1.30 2.82
2. 1880—1890 12.8 1.72 3.58 5.30
3. 1890—1900 12.5 1.64 3.13 4.77
4. 1900—1910 16.3 2.70 4.38 7.08
5. 1910—1920 14.9 2.48 5.78 8.26
6. 1920—1930 15.8 3.90 5.83 9.73
7. 1930—1940 9.6 2.63 1.26 3.89
8. 1940—1950 19.4 5.88 4.52 10.40
B. INTERDECADE CHANGES, SUCCESSIVE PHASES
9. Line I to line 2 2.8 0.20 2.28 2.48
10. Line 2 to line 3 —0.3 —0.08 —0.45 —0.53
11. Line 3 to line 4 3.8 1.06 1.25 2.31
12. Line 4 to line 5 —1.4 —0.22 1.40 1.18
13. Line S to line 6 0.9 1.42 0.05 1.47
14. Line 6 to line 7 —6.2 —1.27 —4.57 —5.84
15. Line 7 to line 8 9.8 3.25 3.26 6.51
C. CHANGES BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE PHASES
16. Line9 to line tO —3.1 —0.28 —2.73 —3.01
17. Line 10 to line 11 +4.1 +1.14 +1.70 +2.84
18. Line 11 to line 12 —5.2 —1.28 +0.15 —1.13
19. Line 12 to line 13 +2.3 +1.64 —1.35 +0.29
20. Line 13 to line 14 —7.1 —2.69 —4.62 —7.31
21. Line 14 to line 15 +16.0 +4.52 +7.83 +12.35
SOURCE, BY COLUMN
(1) Calculated from the five-year averages in Table R-37. For line 1, the entry was
calculated as the difference between the five-year average centered at 1880 and the
three-year average for 1869—1871, centered at 1870.
(2) Calculated from the study referred to in text footnote 6. Entries cover native white
(from Table 1.11) and Negroes or nonwhites (from Table 1.14).
(3) Calculated from ibid., Table P-4B, by method described in the text. Entries cover
native whites and Negroes.
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quite wide—indeed, wider on a relative basis than that in additions to
total population (columns 4 and 1 in part C compared with the same
columns in part A). With additions to total population running from
about 1.6 to 3.5 times as large as total internal migration, the same
relative amplitude of long swings should yield for column 4 of part C
entries about three-tenths or six-tenths of those in column 1. Instead,
the differential change for internal migration is in two cases (lines 16
and 20) either larger than or close to that in additions to total popula-
tion; and in two other cases (lines 17 and 21), from about seven-tenths
to over three-quarters as large. When population growth accelerates or
decelerates, the volume of internal migration is affected even more,
relatively.
Population and Capital Formation
Additions to population and its redistribution within the country ob-
viously have far-reaching effects, direct and indirect, on the volume and
structure of economic activity. Residential construction and many re-
lated types of capital formation are directly affected. True, the gross vol-
ume of residential construction is influenced even on the demand side
by needs for replacement and by rising standards of living. On the sup-
ply side, in addition to the lag in the building industry's response to
deficits and surpluses in supply, there are speculative excesses and
financial ups and downs. Yet one may reasonably assume that popula-
tion growth and internal migration are the major direct forces, and
that long swings in population growth are probably followed by
long swings in the volume of residential construction and related capi-
tal formation components.
This assumption provides the rationale for Chart 6, in which we
compare decadal additions to total population, as plotted in Charts 4
and 5, with corresponding totals in the two long series (among the few
available to us) that might be said to represent population-sensitive
capital formation—nonfarm residential construction, and gross capital
expenditures (construction and equipment) by railroads, both in 1929
prices. (If our long series were more detailed, we might have been able
to distinguish within capital formation other population-sensitive
components, particularly within the large, miscellaneous "other" con-
struction.) We assumed that railroad capital expenditures would be
directly affected by population growth, and particularly by internal
migration because expenditures for new construction and equipment
would be responsive to demands created by additional population, in
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the country as a whole and in areas gaining rapidly from internal
migration. Conversely, once railroad construction was accelerated, it
would in turn affect internal migration.
In Chart 6 the decadal volumes of gross nonf arm residential con-
struction and of railroad construction and equipment expenditures are
CHART6
Decadal Levels of Population-Sensitive Gross Capital Formation, 1929 Prices,
Compared with Decada Additions to Population, 1869—1955
aAdditions to population
bCapital expenditures by railroads
CNontarm residential construction









comparedwith decadal additions to total population. More logically,
net totals of capital formation might have been compared with net
additions to population, but the former are estimated by deducting
from the gross totals a rather approximate estimate of depreciation,
and in trying to establish long swings, there is some advantage in using
series that are not affected too much by crude statistical approxi-
mations. Needless to say, the long swings in the net volumes of nonfarm
residential construction and of railroad capital expenditures would be
even more marked than those in the gross series, and would perhaps
have slightly earlier turning points.
The decadal totals of the capital formation components in Chart 6
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are centered in the fifth year. Thus, additions to population from
1869 to 1879 inclusive, centered in 1874, are plotted against total non-
farm residential construction covering the years 1870 through 1879,
centered in 1874. Because the population totals are mid-year figures,
the exact center of the ten-year interval falls in the middle of 1874.
Because the capital formation figures are for calendar years, the
exact center of the ten-year period falls at the end of 1874. As plotted
in Chart 6, the series allow for a lag of one-half year in capital forma-
tion behind the additions to population.
The series are statistically independent. The estimates of nonfarm
residential construction for the years since 1884 are based largely on
building permits and, for the earlier years, on crude breakdowns be-
tween residential and other construction, with the over-all construc-
tion totals derived largely from the flow of construction materials into
domestic use. The capital expenditures by railroads were estimated on
the basis of a large sample of reports by individual railroads. And the
total additions to population are based on the decennial censuses and
their age, sex, and other breakdowns.7
Both nonfarm residential construction and capital expenditures by
railroads are subject to long swings, approximately the same in timing
and duration as the long swings in additions to total population. The
existence of these long up-and-down movements has been fairly firmly
established, and is discussed in detail in the Grebler and Ulmer mono-
graphs.
The statistical measures relating to these swings in what we term
population-sensitive capital formation are assembled in Table 61. The
following findings are clearly indicated:
1. The timing of the long swings in nonfarm residential construc-
tion and in railroad capital expenditures is quite similar to that in
the long swings in additions to population. During the nineteenth
century, the turning points in the capital formation series tended to
lag (see lines 2 and 3) (if there was such a lag in the 1870's, the record
does not go back far enough to permit us to see it). The residential con-
7Fordetails on the construction series, see Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, and
Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate: Trends and Pros-
pects (Princeton for NBER, 1956), pp.34—37,and Appendixes A to F, pp. 327—386.
The present study should also be consulted, particularly the notes to Tables R-14
and R-15, column 1, and Table R-3O, columns 1 and 6. For the railroad series and
its derivation, see Melville J. Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, Communications,
and Public Utilities: Its Formation and Financing (Princeton for NBER, 1960), Ap-
pendixes A and C.
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TABLE 61
TIMINGAND AMPLITUDE OF LONG SWINGS IN ADDITIONS TO POPULATION AND IN
POPULATION-SENSITWE CAPITAL FORMATION, 1869—1955




Additions dential itures Capital
to Con-by Rail-Formation
Population structionroads(2) + (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. DATES OF TURNING POINTS
1.First trough 1874 1874 1875 1874
2.Peak 1888 (1885) 1890 1889 1890
3.Trough 1895 (1897) 1899 1899 1899
4.Peak 1909 1909 1909 1909
5.Trough 1917 1916 1918 1916
6.Peak 1924 1925 1925 1925
7.Trough 1935 1934 1935 1934
8.Peak" 1948 1948 1948 1948
9.First trough (line 1) 9.7 6.2 4.2 10.5
10.Peak (line 2) 12.9 (12.8) 20.6 6.2 26.6
11.Trough (line 3) 12.5 (12.6) 17.7 3.3 21.0
12.Peak (line 4) 17.3 23.9 10.0 33.9
13.Trough (line 5) 14.6 18.3 5.9 24.8
14.Peak (line 6) 16.0 40.7 8.0 48.7
15.Trough (line 7) 9.6 15.2 3.2 18.8
16.Peak (line 8) 23.0 34.9 6.3 41.2
C. CHANGES PERYEAR DURING SUCCESSIVE PHASES
17.Trough to peak(line9 to line 10) +0.23 (0.28) +0.90+0.14 + 1.01
18.Peak to trough(line 10 to line 11) —0.06 (—0.02) —0.32 —0.29 —0.62
19.Trough to peak(line 11 to line 12) +0.34 +0.62 +0.67 + 1.29
20.Peak to trough(line 12 to line 13) —0.34 —0.80 —0.46 —1.30
21.Trough to peak(line 13 to line 14) +0.20 + 2.49+0.30+2.66
22.Peak to trough(line 14 to line 15) —0.58 —2.83 —0.48 —3.32
23.Trough to peak(line 15 to line 16) +1.03 +1.41+0.24+1.60
I). CHANGESBETWEEN SUCCESSIVE PHASES
24.Trough to trough (line 17 to line 18) —0.29 —1.22 —0.43 —1.63
25.Peak to peak (line 18 to line 19) +0.40 +0.94+0.96 + 1.91
26.Trough to trough (line 19 to line 20) —0.68 —1.42 —1.13 —2.59
27.Peak to peak (line 20 to line 21) +0.54 +3.29+0.76+3.96
28.Trough to trough (line 21 to line 22) —0.78 —5.32 —0.78 —5.98
29.Peak to peak (line 22 to line 23) +1.61 +4.24+0.72+4.92
Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
For first year included in all series.
b For last year included in all series.
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NOTES TO TABLE 61
SOURCE, BY COLUMN
(1) Sce notes to Table 59.
(2) Ten-year moving totals calculated from the annual series underlying Table R-30.
The totals are centered in the fifth year.
(3) Ten-year moving totals calculated from the annual series given through 1950 in
Melville J. Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, Communications, and Public Ujilities: Its
Formation andFinancing(Princeton for NBER, 1960), Table C-I, col. 4, p. 257.
Ulmer's series on gross capital expenditures in current prices was extrapolated
through 1954 by expenditures for new plant and equipment by railroads (Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1956, p. 498). His index of cost of road and equipment
was extrapolated by the index implicit in railroad construction (ibid., pp. 757 and
758). From these two series it was possible to calculate an extension of the 1.29
price series on gross capital expenditures.
struction estimates before 1889 are rather crude, but the series on
railroad capital expenditures is not. Offhand one might expect a lag
in the response of construction and capital equipment expenditures
to population increase, but its length would depend upon conditions of
the productive system over the period—with which we are not familiar.
2. The amplitude of the long swings in both residential construction
and railroad capital expenditures is far wider than the amplitude of
the swings in additions to total population. This is not unexpected be-
cause increase in numbers is only one of several temporally correlated
factors (internal migration, per capita income changes, and others)
that would produce long swings in residential construction and in
railroad capital expenditures.
5. The amplitude of the long swings in the capital formation com-
ponents would have been far wider had we used net rather than gross
volumes.
4. The amplitude of those long swings, relative to the average vol-
ume, widened over the period, as did the amplitude of )ong swings in
additions to population. While this finding should be qualified in view
of the crudity of the estimates of nonfarm residential construction dur-
ing the first two decades, it has been establishedover the shorter period
in the Grebler monograph, and merits consideration at least as a tenta-
tive finding.
5. Association in time is not causation, and the association found is
no proof that the swings in population growth and internal migration
produce swings in residential and railroad construction. Indeed, it may
well be that other factors produce at the same time swings in popula-
tion growth and internal migration, as well as those in residential and
railroad construction; and that if the former swings induced the latter
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swings the lags would have been longer and the synchronism less con-
spicuous. The mechanism of connection is still to be explored.
We now turn to the other components of capital formation and ask
how they move when the population-sensitive components display long
swings of rather wide amplitude that are synchronous with the long
swings in population growth and in internal migration. The answer
to this question is provided in Chart 7, in which the successive ten-
year totals of population-sensitive capital formation are plotted along-
side ten-year totals of residual (that is, "other") capital formation, the
latter including or excluding government. The residual is a miscellane-
ous category which, in line b comprises "other" construction including
government, "other" producers' durable equipment including muni-
dons, changes in inventories, and changes in claims against foreign
CHART7
Population-Sensitive Capital Formation Compared with Other Gross Capital





















bOther gross capttot formation
COther private gross capitol formation
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countries. In line c government is excluded and we deal with "other"
private capital formation alone, i.e., a sum of "other" private con-
struction, "other" producers' durables exclusive of munitions, changes
in inventories, and changes in foreign claims. In both cases there is
a semblance of negative association until the 1920's, and positive asso-
ciation thereafter between long swings in population-sensitive capital
formation and in "other" capital formation.
Table 62 provides a check on this impression. Here we record the
standings, changes per year during successive phases, and differential
changes between successive phases for total and other capital forma-
tion, during the phases of long swings in population-sensitive capital
formation. To use the National Bureau terminology, we employ the
dates of turning points in long swings in population-sensitive capital
formation as a reference chronology for observing changes in total and
private gross capital formation (columns 2 and 4) and other capital
formation, inclusive and exclusive of government (columns S and 5).
By comparing column 1 with columns S and 5, lines 16 to 19, we find
that through the first four swings (trough to trough and peak to peak)
the differential change in other capital formation moved inversely to
the differential change in population-sensitive capital formation. This
suggests that when population-sensitive capital formation was increas-
ing more rapidly, other capital formation was increasing less rapidly,
and vice versa. It suggests also that there were limits to total capital
formation with the result that acceleration (or deceleration) in the
population-sensitive components left so much less (or so much more)
room for the growth of other capital formation. This restraining in-
fluence of a limit on total capital formation appears to have been
removed in the 1920's, and synchronism has prevailed since then.8
8 This is only one possible interpretation, for much depends upon the mechanism
of response. In his comments on this chapter, Abramovitz argued an alternative in-
terpretation, based largely upon a positive association between population-sensitive
and other capital formation, with a long lag (not assumed here) of the population-
sensitive components behind other capital formation, particularly at the peak. In
other words, with other capital formation more closely keyed to the rate of change
in output and income than are the population-sensitive components (which are
more closely associated with population growth), the negative association observed
before World War I may have arisen because the rate of growth of output reached
its peaks and troughs long before population growth did, and because of the
sluggish response of railroad construction and house building to deficits and sur-
pluses in the supply of railroad facilities and houses.
At the present juncture, we cannot say which interpretation is the more likely.
But the point to be stressed here is that, given the possibility of varying leads and
lags among the variables in the response of one to the other (for instance, of resi-
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TABLE 62
CHANGES IN POPULATION-SENSITIVE AND OTHER GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION DURING PHASES
OF LONG SWINGS IN POPULATION-SENSITIVE CAPITAL FORMATION, 1870—1954





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. VOLUMES PER DECADE AT DATES OF TURNING POINTS IN COLUMN I
1.Trough, 1874 10.5 26.6 16.1 25.3 14.8
2.Peak;1890 26.6 64.4 37.8 61.5 34.9
3.TrOugh, 1899 21.0 88.6 67.6 83.9 62.9
4.Peak,1909 33.9 118.3 84.4 108.7 74.8
5.Trough, 1916 24.8 142.0 117.2 122.4 97.6
6.Peak,1925 48.7 177.5 128.8 155.7 107.0
7.Trough, 1934 18.8 118.0 99.2 85.1 66.3
8.Peak,1948 41.2 302.5 261.3 219.8 178.6
B. CHANGES PER YEAR DURING SUCCESSIVE PHASES
9.Trough to peak(line I to line 2) +1.01+2.36+1.36+2.26+1.26
10.Peak to trough(line 2 to line 3) —0.62+2.69 +3.31+2.49 +3.11
11.Trough to peak(line 3 to line 4) +1.29+2.97+1.68+2.48+1.19
12.Peak to trough(line 4 to line 5) —1.30+3.39+4.69 + 1.96+3.26
13.Trough to peak(line 5 to line 6) +2.66+3.94+1.29+3.70+1.04
14.Peak to trough(line 6 to line 7) —3.32 —6.61 —3.29 —7.84 —4.52
15.Trough to peak(line 7 to line 8) +1.60+13.18+11.58+9.62+8.02
C. CHANGES BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE PHASES
16.Trough to trough (line9 to line 10) —1.63±0.33+1.95+0.23+1.85
17.Peak to peak (line 10 to line 11)+1.91+0.28 —1.63 —0.01 —1.92
18.Trough to trough (line 11 to line 12) —2.59+0.42 +3.01 —0.52+2.07
19.Peak to peak (line 12 to line 13)+3.96+0.55 —3.40+1.74 —2.22
20.Trough to trough (line 13 to line 14) —5.98—10.55 —4.58—11.54 —5.56
21.Peak to peak (line 14 to line 15)±4.92+19.79+14.87+17.46+12.54
SOURCE, BY COLUMN
(1) See Table 61, col. 4.
(2) Ten-year moving totals, calculated from the annual series underlying Table R-29,
centered on fIfth year.
(4) Col. 2 minus ten-year moving totals of government construction and munitions,
calculated from the annual series underlying Table R-30, or given in Table R-7.
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To test the probability of the inverse correlation in long swings be-
tween population-sensitive and other capital formation, we first dis-
tinguish the major subcomponents of other capital formation and ob-
serve the characteristics of their long swings. In Chart 8 we have the
CHART8
Decadal Levels of Components of Private Gross Capital Formation Other Than
Population-Sensitive, 1929 Prices, 1869—1955
aPrivate gross capital formation other than population-sensitive
bNet changes in inventories
CNet changes In foreign claims
d'OTher" private gross capital forrnotion excluding net changes in
















successive decade totals, in 1929 prices, for private gross capital forma-
tion excluding nonfarm residential construction and railroad capital
expenditures; other private construction plus other private producers'
dential construction to population growth), an interpretation of the association
in movements over time depends upon the lead and lag allowed. If time discrepan-
cies in response are substantial, synchronism may in fact mean absence, rather than
presence, of significant association. This problem is particularly acute with long-
term changes, because the time variance of the leads and lags can be much wider






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































durables; net changes in inventories; and net changes in claims against
foreign countries.
On the whole, the dating of the long swings in these four totals is
fairly similar. Of particular interest are the prominent swings in the
net changes in claims against foreign countries, a series that is statisti-
cally independent of the others and has an adequate basis. The series
on net changes in inventories is less significant, because before 1919
it was estimated largely as a function of changes in total commodity
flow. All one can say about it is that if changes in inventories can
reasonably be estimated as such a function, the timing of their long
swings is fairly similar to that of the long swings in net changes in
foreign claims and in other private capital formation. The series on
other construction and producers' durables (line d), quantitatively a
major component of total or of private capital formation, shows swings
that are a bit different in timing from the others—reaching a peak
late rather than early in the first decade of this century. But the simi-
larity of long swings in the several totals—excluding government con-
struction and munitions which we would not expect to follow the
same pattern—is clear.
Table 63 presents the usual measures of the long swings for the four
totals in Chart 8 and, in addition, for the widest total of "other" capi-
tal formation—gross, including government. It indicates the rather
marked amplitude of the long swings, not only in the net change com-
ponents (inventories and foreign claims), but also in the gross com-
ponents in column 3. And it shows, particularly in parts A and D, that,
given the rough similarity in dating of the long swings, there is a
fair correlation among the long swings in the components of other
capital formation. Long swings with approximately the same dating
can be found in all of them.
In our final test of the probability of the inverse correlation in
long swings between population-sensitive and "other" capital forma-
tion, we turn to Table 64. Here we use the dates of turning points of
the long swings in population-sensitive capital formation as a refer-
ence chronology (as in Table 62) and measure standings and changes
for the resulting reference phases in the total and the three components
of other private capital formation (excluding the government com-
ponent, because it may be affected by many other factors).
In lines 16 to 19, we would expect to find a series of +,—, +, —, an
exact inversion of the sequence of differential changes between suc-
cessive phases of population-sensitive capital formation (which runs
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TABLE 64
CHANGESINCOMPONENTS OF PRIVATE GROSS CAPITAL FoRMATIoN OTHER THAN
POPULATION-SENSITIVE DURING PHASES OP LONG SwINGs IN
POPULATION-SENSITIVE CAPITAL FORMATION, 1870—1954
(billions of dollars, in 1929 prices)






Total Durables tories Claims
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. VOLUMES PER DECADE AT DATES OF TURNING POINTS
IN POPULATION-SENSITIVE CAPITAL FORMATION
1.First trough, 1874 14.8 10.7 4.9 0.8
2.Peak, 1890 34.9 32.2 4.3 —1.6
3.Trough, 1899 62.9 51.5 7.1 4.2
4.Peak, 1909 74.8 66.2 7.7 0.9
5.Trough, 1916 97.6 65.8 12.2 19.6
6.Peak, 1925 107.0 92.9 6.2 8.0
7.Trough, 1934 66.3 63.5 —1.4 4.1
8.Peak, 1948 178.6 154.2 17.7 6.6
B. CHANGES PER YEAR DURING SUCCESSIVE PHASES
9.Trough to peak(line 1 to line 2) + 1.26 + 1.34 —0.04 —0.05
10.Peak to trough(line 2 to line 3) + 3.11 +2.14 +0.31 +0.64
11.Trough to peak(line 3 to line 4) +1.19 +1.47 +0.06 —0.33
12.Peak to trough(line 4 to line 5) +3.26 —0.06 +0.64 +2.67
13.Trough to peak(line 5 to line 6) +1.04 +3.01 —0.67 —1.29
14.Peak to trough(line 6 to line 7) —4.52 —3.27 —0.84 —0.43
15.Trough to peak(line 7 to line 8) +8.02 +6.48 + 1.36 +0.18
C. CHANGES BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE PHASES
16.Trough to trough (line9 to line 10) + 1.85 +0.80 +0.35 +0.69
17.Peak to peak (line 10 to line ii) —1.92 —0.67 —0.25 —0.97
18.Trough to trough (line 11 to line 12) +2.07 —1.53 +0.58 +3.00
19.Peak to peak (line 12 to line 13) —2.22 +3.07 —1.31 —3.96
20.Trough to trough (line 13 to line 14) —5.56 —6.28 —0.17 +0.86
21.Peak to peak (line 14 to line 15) + 12.54 + 9.75 +2.20 +0.61
Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
For dates of turning points, see Table 61, col. 4. For source, see notes to Table 63,
cob. 2, 3, 4, and ,respectively.
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—, —, +)- Wedo find such complete negative association for net
changes in inventories and net changes in claims against foreign
countries (columns l and 4). Before the 1920's, upswings in population-
sensitive capital formation were accompanied by downswings in in-
ventory accumulation and in capital exports (upswings in capital im-
ports); and, conversely, downswings in population-sensitive capital for-
mation were accompanied by upswings in inventory accumulation and
in capital exports (downswings in capital imports). Of these associations
the most interesting is that with capital imports. When population-
sensitive capital formation was in the up-phase of the long swing—pre-
sumably in response to an upswing in immigration, native population
growth, and internal migration—capital imports were also in the up-
phase of the long swing; and the same association persisted in the down-
swing.
The results for other private construction and producers' durables
are not so clear (lines 16 to 19, column 2). There are only two, agree-
ments out of the four expected, and the case of negative association is
not proved as it stands. But one qualification of this finding must be
taken into consideration. Nonfarm residential construction and capi-
tal expenditures by railroads are not the only components of capital
formation that can be regarded as directly and positively affected by
additions to population and by internal migration. There are a variety
of others—construction of stores, local transportation facilities, serv-
ice establishments, and so on—which, being directly geared to the
provision of services to ultimate consumers, could be expected to re-
flect the long swings in the additions to population and in the extent
of migration to new areas. All these population-sensitive components
of capital formation are included in the category labeled "other"
private construction and producers' durables (column 2 of Table 64).
This, therefore, is a mixed category, and may include substantial com-
ponents whose long swings are positively, rather than negatively, asso-
ciated with the long swings in population growth. If we could draw a
finer line of distinction, and remove more of the population-sensitive
components, column 2 might show the same sequence of signs in lines
16 through 19 as columns 3 and 4 show, indicating negative associa-
tion with the measures for additions to population.
We conclude this section with the tentative findings that the long
swings in additions to population and in internal migration are syn-
chronous with long swings in population-sensitive components of capi-
tal formation (nonfarm residential construction and capital expendi-
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tures by railroads, which can be segregated in our estimates, and prob-
ably in several other components which cannot be segregated); until
the l920's these long swings in population growth and in population-
sensitive capital formation are coterminous with opposite swings in
"other" private capital formation (total, net changes in inventories, net
changes in foreign claims, and possibly the "other" construction and
producers' durables components). But the association between the long
swings in population-sensitive and other capital formation shifted from
negative to positive, beginning with the 1920's. This suggests that what-
ever factors tended to prevent synchronous acceleration in the popula-
tion-sensitive and the other components of capital formation before the
1920's ceased to be operative after World War I.
Population Movements and Additions to Product
In the preceding discussion of the possible effects of long swings in
population growth and internal migration on demand for certain popu-
lation-sensitive components of capital formation, we found, in addi-
tion to the expected positive association, a negative association with
long swings in "other" capital formation before the 1920's. The ques-
tion naturally arises whether these associations have affected total
output.
A first, rather tentative, answer to this question is suggested by the
comparisons in Chart 9. Line a relates to private construction and
producers' durables, excluding the population-sensitive components.
This is a measure of gross additions to durable capital stock within the
country, excluding stock serving primarily needs for housing and rail-
road transportation (its inclusion would not change the picture ma-
terially). We might have included also changes in inventories but,
in view of the rough basis of the estimates before 1919, it seemed best
to omit that component.
Line 1, measures decadal additions to the labor force. It would have
been desirable to limit the series to additions to the labor force not en-
gaged in nonfarm residential construction or in producing construc-
tion materials, but that was impossible with the existing data. Another
desirable exclusion would have been the labor force engaged in pro-
vision of services not embodied in commodities. We can only hope
that the long swings in the labor force excluding those engaged in con-
















DecadalLevelsof Private Gross Construction and Producers' Durables Exclud-
ing Population-Sensitive Capital Formation, and Decadal Additions to Labor
Force, Compared with Decadal Additions to Gross National Product Excluding
Services, 1870—1955
aPrivate gross construction and producers' durabtns excluding
population—sensitive capital formation, 929 prices
bAdditions to labor force











































ices are not unlike the swings in the total labor force portrayed in
Chart 9.
The two lines just described, which represent additions to factors of
production, are compared with additions to gross national product
excluding services (line c). Services are excluded because two major
components are the net yield of residential housing, and government
services (and we wish to exclude the latter from the analysis). The com-
parison is thus quite crude, and yet the results merit consideration.
There isfair consilience between the combined movements of
"other" private durable capital formation and additions to the labor
force, on the one hand, and additions to what might be called gross
commodity product, on the other. There is a downswing in cap-
ital formation from the mid-1870's to the early 1880's, and in additions
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to the labor force from the late 1870's to the late 1880's; and there is
a similar downswing in additions to gross commodity product from
the late 1870's to the late 1880's. There is an upswing in capital forma-
tion from the early 1880's to about the middle of the first decade of
the twentieth century, and an upswing in additions to the labor force
from the late 1880's also to the middle of the first decade of this cen-
tury; and an upswing in additions to commodity product from the
late 1880's to about 1900. There follows a downswing in capital forma-
tion from about the middle of the first decade of this century to about
1917, and a marked downswing in additions to the labor force from
about 1905 to about 1916; and a similar downswing in additions to
gross commodity product from about 1900 to about 1915. Beyond
World War I the similarity continues—provided we combine the move-
ments of capital formation and additions to labor force.
The association just described is measured in Table 65 which records
the standings, the changes per year during successive phases, and the
differential changes between successive phases, for all the series during
the phases of the long swings in additions to gross national product
excluding services. Lines 16 to 21 are particularly instructive. If the
changes in capital formation and labor are weighted equally (the latter
should be given greater weight, but the labor force totals used here
are more comprehensive than they should be for our purposes), the
sum of the differential changes in columns 2 and S agrees in sign with
those in column 1 in five out of six cases. The implication is that long
swings in additions to gross national product, excluding services, are
associated with long swings in private gross durable capital formation,
excluding the population-sensitive components, and with long swings
in additions to the labor force.
It should be remem:bered that long swings in additions to population
were associated, at least until the 1920's, with opposite swings in capi-
tal formation other than population-sensitive. If this other capital
formation contributed to swings in additions to commodity product
(national, excluding services), there should have been, at least until
the 1920's, a negative association between long swings in population
growth and in additions to commodity product. This is confirmed, if
only partly, in column 4 of Table 65, where we measure changes in
additions to total population during phases of long swings in additions
to commodity product. During the first two phases (lines 16 and 17),


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bears a sign opposite to that for additions to commodity product
(column 1). The correlation would be more significantly negative if
column 1 were based on additions to commodity product per capita.
The associations indicated in Chart 9 and Table 65 suggest a mecha.
nism by which long swings in population growth produced, at least
before the 1920's, opposite swings in additions to product. The ac-
celeration or retardation in growth of population numbers, by pro-
ducing similar swings in population-sensitive capital formation, re-
sulted in opposite swings in all other capital formation. At the same
time, those swings in population growth, even if largely dominated by
immigration, did not result immediately in similar swings in additions
to the labor force. The reasons may be that there were other movements
in labor force participation by the population already resident in the
country, and also that—insofar as swings in population growth were
produced by up.and-down movements in the rate of natural increase—
additions to the labor force would come much later. Hence the in.
verted swings in other than population-sensitive capital formation,
not offset by any positive swings in additions to the labor force, tended
to produce swings in additions to product that were, until the 1920's,
negatively associated with swings in population growth.
Another facet of this association is portrayed graphically in Chart 10.
Here we have decadal additions to total population compared with
decadal additions to flow of goods to consumers, total and per capita.
All three measures are calculated in identical fashion—as changes be.
tween five-year moving averages, ten years apart, and centered in the
middle of each decade interval.
Total flow of goods to consumers includes services not embodied in
new commodities but does not include capital formation. In these
two respects itdiffers from the gross commodity product changes
plotted in Chart 9. But because flow of goods to consumers is such a
large fraction of gross national product, and because the movement of
services in the short run was estimated for the earlier years as a func-
tion of commodity movement, the movement of additions to total flow
of goods to consumers in Chart 10 is more or less like that of additions
to total commodity product in Chart 9. The similarity indicates that
the factors suggested earlier as determinants of the long swings in addi-
tions to total commodity product also determine the long swings in
additions to flow of goods to consumers. It is these factors that produce
a semblance of negative association between long swings in population
346Population Growth and Countrywide Aggregates
CHART10
Decadal Additions to Population Compared with Decadal Additions to Flow
of Goods to Consumers, 1869—1955
growth and those in additions to total flow of goods to consumers,
until the period of World War I.
As a result, the long swings in additions to flow of consumer goods
per Capitaare inverted to those in additions to population in the years
before World War I—and quite prominent. Yet they suggest one ex-
planation of the swings in additions to population, if we allow for a
long lag that would, in a sense, turn negative into positive association.
It must be remembered that an important component of additions to
population was immigration. Immigration, particularly in its timing,
could be assumed to be responsive to the pull—that is, largely to con-
ditions in this country rather than in the country of origin. This as-
sumption of responsiveness to the pull is clearly indicated by the fact
that net additions were affected not only by gross inflow but also by
emigration, which clearly reflected conditions in this country. It is
indicated also by the fact that the long swings in emigration from Va-
347
aAdditions to population
bAdditions to flow of goods to consumers • 1929 prices
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rious countries of origin were fairly similar. One could, then, argue
that a sizable reduction in additions to per capita flow of goods to
consumers (with some lag), all other conditions being equal, would
represent a discouragement to immigration, while a sizable rise in addi-
tions to per capita flow of goods to consumers would represent an
encouragement. This is not to contend that additions to per capita
CHART11
Decadal Additions to Population Compared with Decadal Levels of Unem-
ployment and Bank Earnings Ratio, 1870—1955
flow of goods to consumers were necessarily a major element in pro-
ducing swings in immigration, and thus in additions to population (as
well as in internal migration and natural increase), but they may have
contributed to them. The importance of additions to per capita flow
of goods to consumers in the present connection lies in the fact that,
at least before World War I, they can be identified as after-effects of
long swings in population growth.
That the swings in additions to per capita flow of goods to consumers
do not tell the whole story is suggested by Chart 11. We tried, in this
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chart, to compare the long swings in population growth with some
measures of the state of the economy that would indicate changes in
degree of engagement of resources and profitability—conditions of pull
that would affect not only net immigration but also internal migration
and the rate of natural increase. We found only two relevant measures
for the long period to be covered, although a further search might un-
earth more. One is an index of unemployment taken as a percentage
of nonfarm employees. Even pieced out in various ways, this index
could be carried back only to the early 1890's. The other index is the
profit earning record of national banks (the ratio of profits to total
capital accounts). The indexes, shown as lines b and c in Chart 11, are
decadal averages centered on the fifth year.
In both series, the long swings reflecting general economic condi-
tions, while similar to those in population additions, precede them by
significant periods varying from two to five years. The indexes have
turning points that, in consequence, are fairly close in timing to
those in additions to per capita flow of goods to consumers in Chart 10.
They add to the impression that there may be some validity in assum-
ing that the lag in response of population movements to changes in
economic conditions in the United States contributed in some measure
to the inverted long swings in additions to product per capita, which
set the stage for the next long swing in population growth.
If there was such a self-perpetuating mechanism of long swings be-
fore World War I,it disappeared thereafter. The reasons for the
change are not far to seek. To begin with, immigration was greatly
restricted. Second, the two world wars made for a change in timing
that brought about a coincidence of the long swings in residential
construction and in other components of capital formation. Finally,
the productive capacity of the country after World War I was such
that the earlier limits that prevented synchronous upswings in popu-
lation-sensitive capital formation and in other capital formation ceased
to operate. This is clearly indicated by the shift from debtor to creditor
position in the international capital markets, by the ease with which
expansions were attained after World War I without running into
the capacity bottlenecks that were a common feature of the cyclical ex-
pansions in this country before that war, and by the tremendous re-
serve capacity revealed during World War II in contrast with our ex-
perience in World War I.
349Long Swings
The Countrywide Aggregates
We conclude the discussion of long swings in the output flows by ob-
serving those in the countrywide aggregates. Chart 12 presents decadal
averages of gross national product excluding military, flow of goods
to consumers, total and per capita, and gross capital formation ex-
cluding military. The inclusion of military output would alter the
picture only slightly, affecting the standing from about 1913 through
1922 and from about 1937 through 1950, but without changing the
timing of the long swings observed.
CHART12
Decädal Levels of Gross National Product, Flow of Goods to Consumers, Gross
Capital Formation, and Flow of Goods to Consumers Per Capita, 1929 Prices,
1869—1955
aGross notional product excluding military
bFlow of goods to consumers
CGross capital formation escluding military
dFlow of goods to consumers per capita
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Because the totals in Chart 12 have a pronounced long-term upward
rise, they have been plotted on a ratio scale to reveal more sharply
the long swings in rate of growth. The long swings in gross national
product, in flow of goods to consumers, and in flow of consumer goods
per capita are quite clear. In gross capital formation, however, the
movement up to World War I reveals no marked long swings. Ap-
parently the difference in timing between the long swings of popula-
tion-sensitive components and of other capital formation, which pre-
vailed until World War I, resulted in so much cancellation that the
comprehensive capital formation totals fail to reveal distinct long
swings.
In lines 1 to 5 of Table 66 we attempt to date the turning points
of long swings in the major countrywide aggregates. As in all other
cases discussed so far, the dating is based on a close inspection of the
charts of decadal averages and on calculation, if necessary, of suc-
cessive changes. The dating follows the rule of regarding a phase as
terminated only when the beginning of a new phase is clearly indicated.
The results are naturally subject to error, but they suffice to outline
the broad timing of the swings.
The long swings in gross national product, including or excluding
military, and in flow of goods to consumers, total or per capita, were
quite similar in timing. There was an upswing from 1873 (the earliest
year that can be covered in the procedure followed here) to the early
1880's; a downswing to about 1893 (somewhat earlier in flow of con-
sumer goods per capita); another upswing to 1908 (although the peak
came earlier in flow of consumer goods per capita); a downswing to
1915 or 1916 (with flow of consumer goods per capita again reaching
a trough earlier); an upswing to the middle of the 1920's; a marked
downswing to the early or mid-1930's; and then a sharp rise to 1950,
the most recent year covered by our averages.
The long swings in gross capital formation are discernible beginning
with the peak in the 1920's, and from that date on they follow closely
those for gross national product and flow of goods to consumers. Since,
as stated above, it is extremely difficult to discern the long swings in
total capital formation before World War I, the dates in line 5, col-
umns 3 to 5, are quite problematical.
The dates of turning points in long swings in the various components
of gross capital formation, discussed in the preceding sections, are also
entered in Table 66. Three general impressions are suggested by these



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Population Growth and Countrywide Aggregates
product and flow of goods to consumers, which can be used as a ref-
erence chronology. First, the timing of the long swings among the
various components of capital formation isdifferent, particularly
before the 1920's, and for some components (net changes in inven-
tories and in foreign claims) there are differences even in recent dec-
ades. Second, before World War I, the long swings in many components
of capital formation were neither positively nor negatively correlated
with swings in gross national product and in flow of goods to con-
sumers, but were in between—their peaks and troughs falling within
the phases of the reference chronology. Third, the partly inverted rela-
tion between long swings in the population-sensitive and in other com-
ponents of capital formation accounts for the mild character of long
swings in total gross capital formation before World War I (and dur-
ing the latter, if we include military production). It explains also the
difficulty of discerning clearly marked turning points.
Using the dates of long swings in gross national product as a refer-
ence chronology, we can measure the amplitude of the long swings in
all major countrywide totals (Table 67). In addition to providing the
usual measures of standings at troughs and peaks, the rate of change
per year during the up-and-down phases, and the differential change
from one phase to the next, we attempt here to measure relative
amplitude. The base is the average volume of the specific series during
the swing for which the differential change is measured. To simplify
calculations, the average volume is derived from the standings in
part A; and, in calculating the ratio of the differential change over the
long swing to the average volume, we first convert the differential
change to a per decade rather than a per year basis.
Several findings, some already indicated, are clearly suggested by
Table 67.
1. Gross national product, including and excluding military, and
flow of goods to consumers, total and per capita, reflect the long
swings as dated, without exception. This is not true of gross capital
formation, including or excluding military. It shows a rise in rate of
growth from 1873—1882 to 1882—1893, instead of a decline as expected
by the reference chronology; and for totals including military the de-
cline in line 18 is too mild to be significant.
2. When converted to percentages of the base, the differential change
in decadal rates of growth during the long swings varies, even in the
conforming series (gross national product and flow of goods to con-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































because the secular trend in these series is upward, the negative changes
tend to be smaller than the positive. The average of the two changes
(disregarding signs), taken as a fair representation of the amplitude of
each long swing, varies from 10 to 44 per cent of the base for the gross
national product series, and from about 12 to 33 per cent for the flow
of goods to consumers series.
3. The relative amplitude of the long swings tends to widen—a re-
sult largely of the long sharp depression of the 1930's and of the re-
covery thereafter.
4. If we were to take the differential change over the long swings as
a percentage not of the absolute volume of the series, but of the aver-
age change per decade during the swing, the relative amplitude would
be much wider; and the trend toward widening the relative amplitude
would be much sharper. To put it differently, the long swings affect
the cumulative volumes of gross national product and its components
in the manner indicated in part E of Table 67; but they affect the rate
of change in those volumes in much more violent fashion.
One final inference should be stressed. If the long swings in gross
capital formation differ in timing from those characterizing gross na-
tional product, it follows that the ratio of gross capital formation to
gross national product—the gross national savings fraction—must dis-
play long swings of its own. Indeed, the same result would follow even
if the swings in the numerator (gross capital formation) and the de-
nominator (gross national product) of the fraction were identical in
timing but differed in relative (proportional) amplitude.
Chart 13 shows four measures of the relation between capital for-
mation and national product (both excluding military because, as
before, we wished to eliminate it from the analysis). In line a we have
the proportion of gross capital formation to gross national product—
both in terms of ten-year moving averages and in constant prices. This
ratio describes three peak-to-peak swings, on the assumption that the
initial year in the series is a peak. The dates of these swings are quite
different from those in gross national product recorded in Table 66.
There is a peak in the mid-1870's at about the time of the trough in
gross national product; there is a trough in the early 1880's, when there
is a peak in gross national product; and there is a marked peak in the
early 1890's, when there is a trough in national product. It is only start-
ing with World War I that the swings in the ratio of gross capital
formation to gross national product begin to coincide with those in
gross national product.
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CHART13
Decadal Level of Gross Capital Formation as Per Cent of Gross National
Product, and Marginal Capital-Output Ratios, Based on Volumes in 1929
Prices, 1869—1955
aDecadal level of GCF cod. military as per cent of decadal level of GNP end. military
bDecadal level of GCF end. military as ratio to decodat change in GNP end, military
CDecadal level of NCF end, military as ratio to decadal change in NNP eecL military
dDecadal level of private NCF end. nonform residenlial construction as ratio to
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Theother lines in Chart 13 can be described as marginal capital-
output ratios. Two of them (lines b and c) represent the ratio of capi-
tal formation (gross or net), in the form of a ten-year moving average,
to the increment in national product (gross or net), over essentially
the same ten-year period. In these ratios both capital formation and
national product exclude military. Furthermore, the increment in na-
tional product is derived from quinquennial averages in order to re-
duce short-term variations. Thus, the first entry in line b (or c)ofthe
chart is the ratio of the decennial average of gross (or net) capital
formation for 1871—1880, centered in the fifth year (1875), to the
difference between two quinquennial averages of gross (or net) national
product, one centered in 1871 and the other in 1881. There is a slight
discrepancy in timing: the increment in national product should be
centered at the middle of 1876, whereas capital formation for the pe-
357Long Swings
nod is centered at the end of 1875. But the discrepancy would not
affect the long swings in the ratios materially. Line d portrays perhaps
the most interesting marginal capital-output ratio: the ratio of private
net capital formation excluding nonfarm residential construction to
the increment in net national product excluding services (the method
of relating capital formation to additions to product is the same as
that followed for lines b and c). All the underlying volumes are in
constant prices.
In some periods, capital formation is positive and the decadal change
in product is negative, in which case the marginal capital-output ratio
is infinitely large (as happened during the severe depression of the
1930's). In some periods net capital formation is negative, and the
change in net national product is positive, in which case the marginal
capital-output ratio is negative. Both contingencies could be eliminated
by the use of longer periods for both numerator and denominator. But
this would have resulted in a substantial damping of the long swings
in the marginal capital-output ratios, and we are interested in their
magnitudes unreduced by such damping.
It is clear from Chart 13 that the swings in the marginal capital.
output ratios are extremely wide, even when the periods in which the
ratios drop below zero or become infinitely large are omitted. Table
68, which records the standings and approximate dates of the turning
points of the series in Chart 13, confirms this impression, but the
calculations are impeded by the occurrence of infinitely large values.
There is some similarity between the long swings in the capital for-
mation proportion (line a) and in the marginal capital-output ratios
(lines b, c, and d). However, the latter are affected not only by the
former, but also by the varying rate of growth of national product itself.
Three long swings and the beginning of a fourth are conspicuous; but
the dissimilarity in timing between the swings in the marginal capital-
output ratios and those in the proportion of capital formation to
national product is also quite marked.
With this general indication of the wide amplitude of the long
swings, the evidence in Chart 13 and Table 68 leads to one important
inference. The long-term trend in the gross capital formation pro-
portion is somewhat downward, as can be seen if we calculate the
average ratio for each swing by the procedure followed for the entries
in panel D of Table 67. But the long swings in the standings are ob.
viously an important qualification of this long-term trend, and must
be considered in any interpretation of the past as a basis for the
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TABLE 68
DATESOFTURNING POINTS AND STANDINGS IN LONG SWINGS OF GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION AS
PER CENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, AND OF MARGINAL CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIOS, 1869—1955
Ratio of Private NCF,
Excluding Nonfarm
Ratio of Ratio of Residential
GCF GCF ato NCF ato Construction, to
as % of Additions Additions Additions to NNP a
GNP a toGNP a toNNP a Excluding Services
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. DATES OF TURNING POINTS
1.First peak 1876
2.Trough 1884 1875 1875 1875
3.Peak 1894 1889 1889 1890
4.Trough 1899 1899 1899
5.Peak 1911 1911 1913
6.Trough 1917 1921 1921 1921
7.Peak 1923 Late1920's
8.Trough 1934 1942 1934 1934
9.Peak 1950 1947 (1945)' 1947 (1943)' 1947(l943)b
B. STANDINGS AT DATES INDICATED, BASED ON DECADALLEVELS
10.First peak (line 1) 23.7
11.Trough (line 2) 22.8 3.12 2.07 1.83
12.Peak (line 3) 26.2 8.20 5.57 3.68
13.Trough(line 4) 5.02 2.95 3.08
14.Peak (line 5) 10.27 6.01 8.01
15.Trough(line 6) 21.5 5.21 2.56 2.52
16.Peak (line 7) 21.9 so so so
17.Trough(line 8) 13.9 3.27 0.60 so
18.Peak (line 9) 18.8 3.59 (3.74) 0.97 (1.02) 0.93 (1.12)
Percentages and ratios are based on values in 1929 prices.
GCF =grosscapital formation; GNP =grossnational product.
NCFnet capital formation; NNP =netnational product.
aExcludingmilitary.
b 1947 is the latest year available for all series in cols. 2to4.The peakappears to
fall somewhat earlier, as indicated by the entries in parentheses.
SOURCE: See text for derivation of entries.
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future. This is more conspicuously true of the marginal capital-output
ratios, especially that in line d, which climbs during the first half of
the period, from 1875 to 1913, and then declines sharply during the
second half. One must conclude that the long-term trend in the rela-
tion between additions to capital and additions to output is not per.
sistent, and that any extrapolation into the future must take account
of the variability of the marginal capital-output ratios, not only within
the span of shorter business cycles, but also over the decades that mark
the long swings.
360